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RESPECT TO THE COURT
With ultimate respect to the Court, Claimant desires approaching this complex appeal
with truthfulness, sincerity, integrity, and brevity. Claimant, as a ProSe litigant, appreciates
indulgence by the Court in his good faith effort to apprise the Court of the fact and law on which he relies.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an unemployment eligibility case per Idaho Employment Security Laws:
§72-1312; §72-1366(12), §72-1329, §72-1369(2), and §72-1369(5). Charles Christian Bell
(Claimant) is appealing with persistence, and unfalteringly differs [Agency Record, P7; P42-

P49j, in opinions and decisions, based on the relevant facts of the case, misinterpretation,
translation and erroneous application ofthe phrases "willful intent" and "part-time" employee,
letter and intent of aforementioned associated laws, with subsequent unreasonable Decision(s) of
Appeals Examiner on July 12,2013, docket number 4832-2013, [Agency Record, P1-P6j,
continuing resultant Claimant appeals, and related decisions, denials and rulings by the Idaho
Department of Labor (IDOL), and Idaho Industrial Commission (lIC).

I.

IDOL and IIC's Application / Definition of "Willful" from 1979
The IDOL and lIC's positions, opinions, and rulings rely on their interpretation and

application of the following definition of "willful", and cited herewith from the Idaho Supreme
Court in 1979:
a) Mever v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho, 754, 761,589, P.2d 89, 95 (1979): The Idaho
Supreme Court has defined "willful" as follows:
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"(Willfully) implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the
omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, in the same sense of
having an evil or corrupt motive or intent. It does imply a conscious wrong, and may be
distinguished from an act maliciously or corruptly done in that it does not necessarily
imply an evil mind, but is more nearly synonymous with 'intentionally,' 'designedly,'
'without lawful excuse.' And therefore not accidental." Id. at 565, 201 P. at 1043.
II.

Claimant's Application / Definition of "Willful" from 1984
Claimant contends that even within the held position of the IDOL and IIC through Meyer

v. Skyline Mobile Homes (1979), there remains ambiguous language " ... does imply a conscious
wrong", with further opportunity for scrutiny by the Court; thus, furthering the Claimant's
position ofthere being no evidence presented by the IDOL nor lIC, of a conscious or mindful
wrong perpetrated by Claimant. Claimant's position and opinion relies on the Idaho Supreme
Court's definition of "willful" as cited herewith, comments by Supreme Court Justice Huntley in
1984:
a) Smith v. State Department of Employment, 107 Idaho, 625, 628 691 P.2d, 1240 (1984):
"In Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Home, supra. we reaffirmed earlier Idaho case law
indicating that "willful" implies a conscious wrong. 99 Idaho at 761, 589 P.2d at 96. We
stated:
The Legislature's presumed knowledge of our interpretations of willful in Archbold and
Hall suggests that it intended to disqualify those claimants who purposely, intentionally,
consciously, or knowingly fail to report a material fact, not those whose omission is
accidental because of negligence, misunderstanding or other cause. (Citations omitted.)
To interpret the 'willful' requirement in I.C. § 72-1366 (1), otherwise, as was done in this
case, would create a type of constructive knowledge. We therefore reverse the holding of
the Commission that Claimant willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain
unemployment insurance benefits, as being based upon the erroneous interpretation of
'willful' ."
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1) Any / all acknowledged reporting errors were and remain strictly inadvertent and accidental.
IDOL and HC rulings depend conclusively on Sears' updated pay reporting(s) to Claimant in
April 2013. These updated pay reportings were obtained by Claimant at the request of
IDOL. IDOL solicited Claimant to request, from Sears, physical copies of all pay stubs
documenting compensation to Claimant during the time of Claimant's employment with
Sears [Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibit 17, PI]. Claimant readily complied with this
request from IDOL [Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibit 3, P2, Initial Fact Finding Date 1
Time Stamp 2013-04-08 16:03]. Also note Initial Fact Finding comment [Hearing dated
Jul 9,2013, Exhibit 3, P2, Initial Date 1 Time Stamp 04110113,9:39 am ... ], resulting in

timely response from Claimant [Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibit 18, PI]. Further
communication from the IDOL was by telephone to Claimant, with requests for additional
information [Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibit 3, P3, Initial Fact Finding Date 1 Time
Stamp 05106113, 3:53 pm ... ]. Claimant then provided updated pay reporting(s) through data

supplied by the updated pay stubs reporting( s) in the form of pay stubs from Sears; then,
transferred / copied and delivered in the form of a spreadsheet to IDOL on May 8,2013
[Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibit 19, P2]. The Claimant had no reasonable awareness,

knowledge or access to the aforementioned pay stubs from Sears until April 2013; which was
more than 5 months after Claimant had made initial filing(s) [Agency Record, PSI, note print
date of Wed Apr 03 09:34:50 EDT 2013, for pay stub of 2012-10-05}.
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2) It was, is, and remains thoroughly implausible Claimant forecast I predict the (now corrected
and updated information) utilized by the Claimant for reporting of wages, as provided to the
Claimant by Sears in April 2013, and subsequently forwarded through physical
(hand-delivered) pay stub(s) (wage records) submission to the IDOL on April 4, 2013
[Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibit 3, P2, Initial Fact Finding Date / Time Stamp
2013-04-08 16:03.] Claimant had no access to, knowledge of, or receipt of physical pay
stubs from Sears during timeframe (October 6, 2012, through January 26, 2013]. All claimed
overpayments and associated (purported) discrepancies were caused solely by inadvertence
and accident, and made to a Claimant who had no way of reasonably, rationally, or logically
knowing he received benefits to which he was potentially not entitled. Claimant received
only notification of pay through direct deposit into checking account [Agency Record, P50j.
The direct deposit screen shot merely displays total deposit. It is void of hours worked, rate
of pay, and associated taxes deducted.
Additional comment regarding the physical pay stubs from Sears: These pay stubs,
which were provided to Claimant by Sears in April 2013, verifY an unmistakable lack of
relevant data [Agency Record, P51]. Claimant's pay stubs, from previous employers,
predictably displayed data indicating hours worked and rate of pay; whereas, Sears' pay stubs
are void of this data. Therefore, even considering if Sears had provided Claimant with these
pay stubs during the timeframe of purported errors, and Claimant's routine review of his
online banking deposit statement, it would again present multifarious issues, impeding
precise reporting of hours and wages. It remains the contention of the Claimant he was
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directed by Sears' management to refer to and depend upon what were ever-elusive and
changing posted schedules for reporting of hours worked to the IDOL [Agency Record, P29,
paragraph 1b, ii; Agency Record, P30, paragraph 2b].

3) After notification from the IDOL in April 2013, regarding potential errors within the
reporting period from September 2012 to February 2013, Claimant, with frequency and
persistence, in a timely fashion, willingly responded and cooperatively assisted the IDOL in
discovering and correcting potential errors [Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibits 18 and 23;
Exhibit 34, P 1-P2 and P22-P29].

4) "Based on the evidence in record, the Commission sets forth the following Findings of Fact.
1. Claimant worked for Employer. Employer categorized Claimant as a "part-time"
employee. However, there were weeks that Claimant would work full-time hours, but he
would work less than full-time hours during the following weeks." [Agency Record, P16,
under Findings of Fact, #1}.

5) The interpretation, definition and understanding for full-time employment, as provided and
conveyed to Claimant by Sears' management, are in contrast of the IDOL definition.
Claimant mistakenly acknowledged and accepted to equate Sears' definition as the definitive
and correct definition for full-time employment [Hearing Transcript, P 10, lines 19-25; and
Pll, lines 1-10].

6) In some instances, Sears failed to provide requested information to IDOL [Hearing dated
July 9, 2013, Exhibit 3, P2, Date / Time Stamp 2013-04-01 14:08], and Sears' management
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were unrepresented and absent in hearing of July 9, 2013 [Hearing Transcript dated

July 9,2013, P2, Appearances].
7) Claimant, with frequency and persistence, denies ever knowledgeably committing omissions,
or conscious wrongs, as referred to and asserted in disputed findings and decisions by the
IDOL and IIC. In actuality and fact, Claimant persistently asserted to all parties involved, his
personal commitment, and readily assist in resolution of any potential error(s) [Hearing

dated July 9,2013, Exhibits 18 and 23, and Exhibit 34 PI-P3 and P22-P28].
8) Claimant's ongoing perception was a feeling of being constantly overwhelmed during the
process of IDOL fact-finding progression [Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibit 34, P32].
9) Errors discovered made by IDOL were immediately dismissed and considered unintentional

[Hearing and Audio Recording, Exhibit 22, P 11: Hearing Transcript, P24, lines 9-21, note
spreadsheet clearly shows handwritten additions]; however, unintentional errors made by
Claimant were scrutinized, and deemed without support, as willful and intentional. Claimant
asserts, that perhaps his errors, like those of the IDOL, are purely human error; and there
remains nothing to substantiate anything other than this conclusion.

I.

Summary of Argument
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EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Claimant is self-described as personally and discretely, a deeply private person. Claimant
is cautious and hesitant to readily share personal aspects of his life, particularly in a business
forum. Claimant made mention of, and alluded to, personal adversity(s), within appeal(s) to the
IDOL, subsequently to the lIC, and currently to the Idaho Supreme Court [Agency Record, P28,
II, a., viii.; Hearing dated July 9, 2013, Exhibit 34, P2, paragraphs L. and M]. Although
genuinely not excuses, these seemingly extraordinary, real, substantial, compelling, and
unrelenting events, do establish to the Court that Claimant was (and is) experiencing prolonged
stress within his life. These events likely involuntarily and unwittingly influenced relevant and
essential pieces of his decision-making, ability to set priorities, time constraint perceptions,
follow-up for important issues, organizational skills, critical thinking skills, indispensable coping
skills, and (ongoing) voracious attempts to stabilize normal living conditions. Claimant's reply
to IDOL's request is one (now) considered as reactive by the Claimant [Hearing dated
July 9, 2013, Exhibit 34, P32]. To Claimant's recollection, he has never intentionally exuded the
indulgence of self-pity. However, experienced professionals discerning these types of issues are
likely to perceive the genuine sense of frustration, duress, helplessness, hopelessness, and
desperation within the recorded voice of the Claimant [Audio for Hearing dated July 9, 2013].
Claimant contends, in consideration of his extenuating circumstances, it sensible, logical,
and reasonable to conclude that Claimant, within this timeframe, made what amounts to simple
and unintentional human errors.
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CONCLUSION
There is simply no evidence presented by the IDOL or the HC, to substantiate that
Claimant would have reason or intent, as the IDOL and IIC have unreasonably determined, to set
out with a conscious mind and "willful intent" (as defined and relied upon by the IDOL and IIC
in the Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes. 991daho. 754, 761,589, P.2d 89,95 (1979) ruling), to
unlawfully and unscrupulously obtain monies not rightfully owed to him. He has not the time,
energy, personal paradigm, forethought, nor interest in defrauding any individual, city, state, or
federal entity. Claimant is guiltless of the aforementioned and unsubstantiated claims.
Claimant's assertions of guiltlessness are supported by his understanding, application, intention,
definition and reliance upon Smith v. State Department o{Empioyment, 107 Idaho 625, 628 691
P.2d, 1240 (1984).
to

UPrlCP1H

and

the state of Idaho.
Therefore, the Claimant considers any and all rulings by the Department of Labor and
Idaho Industrial Commission, requiring repayment and penalty, and related to date to this issue,
as unjust, contrary to equity, incompatible to good conscience, and conflicting with the letter and
the intent of the associated rules, statutes, and laws. Due to considerable substantiated and
indisputable fact(s) that Claimant DID NOT willfully, willingly, knowingly, with dishonest
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intent or design, nor with "mens rea" ... a guilty mind ... misrepresent or falsify any documents to
obtain unemployment benefits, as well as distinct legitimate and reasonable verification of
Claimant inadvertently and accidently submitting discrepancies in claims for unemployment
benefits, with substantiation through application and intent of the state statute, codes, and laws, it
is sensible and judicious in the aforementioned decision(s), in the interest and carriage of justice,
Claimant respectfully requests and submits to compel the Court, that this and all associated
rulings be overturned.
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APPELLANT SIGNATURE PAGE

State of Idaho

)
) ss.
)

County of Twin Falls

Charles Christian Bell, being sworn, deposes and says:

IS

statements

Appellate Brief are true

correct

Charles Christian Bell, ProSe
(signature of claimant I appellant)

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this ----:!L"------'_ _ day
(SEAL)
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and belief.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _-=-_ _ _ _ _ day

---'---"'==~-=--=f__-' 2014, a

true and correct copy of the APPELLANT BRIEF was served by regular United States mail upon
each of the following:
Mr. Thomas P. Baskin
Chairman
Idaho Industrial Commission
PO Box 83720
Boise. ID 83720-0041
Tracey K. Rolfsen
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Labor
3 I 7 W Main Street
Boise,ID 83735
Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court - Judicial Branch
PO Box 83720
Boise. ID 83720-010 I

ccb
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